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ARTICLES

United States v. Stevens:
Win, Loss, or Draw for Animals?
DAVID N. CASSUTO
David N. Cassuto, Pace Law School, Brazil-American
Institute for Law & Environment.

Robert Stevens was indicted for marketing dog-fighting videos in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 48, a law criminalizing depictions of animals being “intentionally mutilated, tortured,
wounded, or killed…” The law aimed principally at “crush videos,” but extended to
dog-fighting as well. Stevens challenged the law’s constitutionality and the Supreme
Court eventually struck it down. This article explores whether the Stevens decision will
have lasting implications for animal cruelty jurisprudence. It argues that the answer
is “maybe, but probably not.” In Stevens, the Court skirted the question of whether
preventing animal cruelty can rise to the level of compelling state interest. Ironically,
its avoidance of the issue may constitute a net positive for animal advocacy.
key words: First Amendment, United States v. Stevens, animal cruelty, crush
videos, constitutional law, compelling state interest, free speech

INTRODUCTION

“Crush videos” feature anonymous, leggy women wearing high heels, depicted from the
waist down, grinding small animals to death underfoot while cooing dominatrix patter.
They represented a growing niche market in the fetish video industry in the 1990s. The
U.S. Congress reacted to this increasing demand by passing 18 U.S.C. § 48 in 1999. The
bill criminalized visual or auditory depictions of animals being “intentionally mutilated,
tortured, wounded, or killed” if such conduct violated federal or state law where “the
creation, sale, or possession [of such materials] takes place.” Images with “serious religious,
political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value” were exempt. The
language of the bill was broad enough to include other types of expression unrelated to
crush videos. This breadth concerned President William Clinton. Clinton declared when
signing the bill that the executive branch would interpret the law to cover only depictions
of “wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex” (p. 2558).
Under President George W. Bush, the Department of Justice expanded the law’s
reach. Robert J. Stevens, proprietor of Dogs of Velvet and Steel Productions, was in-
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dicted for marketing dog-fighting videos in violation of § 48. Stevens challenged the
law as unconstitutional, claiming it violated his First Amendment right of freedom of
speech.1 Stevens was convicted at trial, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated his conviction (United States v. Stevens, 2008). The case eventually ended
up before the Supreme Court, which upheld the Court of Appeals, although on slightly
different grounds. The Supreme Court ruled the law unconstitutionally overbroad and
all but invited Congress to pass a narrower law aimed specifically at crush videos (United
States v. Stevens, 2010). Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted H.R. 5566, the Animal
Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, and President Barack Obama signed the bill into
law in December 2010. The new law aims explicitly at crush videos, which it defines as
obscene (a type of expression that the Court has already determined lacks First Amendment protections). The narrow reach of the new law will likely enable it to avoid charges
that it broadly and unconstitutionally curtails free expression.
The question before us here is not whether crush videos are prurient, distasteful,
and sadistic (they are). Neither does the question involve the constitutionality of the
law that the Court struck down (even apologists acknowledge that 18 U.S.C. § 48 was
deeply flawed). This discussion is similarly unconcerned with whether the current law
banning crush videos passes constitutional muster (there is little reason to think otherwise). Rather, the focus here is on what United States v. Stevens means for the world of
animal protection and whether the Court’s decision will have lasting implications for the
campaign to rein in animal cruelty. In my view, the answer is maybe, but probably not.
In Stevens, the Court for the second time skirted the question of whether preventing
animal cruelty can rise to the level of compelling state interest. In doing so, it left an
important and unsettled question of law for another day.
If preventing animal cruelty cannot rise to a compelling state interest, then when
acts of cruelty interweave with fundamental rights, they cannot be outlawed. Broadly
speaking, this conflict between animal cruelty and fundamental rights faced the Court
in Stevens. Congress had passed 18 U.S.C. § 48, which aimed to prevent animal cruelty
by outlawing its depiction. The Court determined that the ban interfered with the right
of free expression and struck the law down. However, it left unresolved whether animal
cruelty could be deemed so important that its prevention could potentially justify some
constraints on free expression. If the Court were to so find, the ruling would have both
cultural and legal significance. On a cultural level, the Court would be recognizing that
preventing animal cruelty constitutes one the few allowable reasons for constraining
speech. Congress could then use its power to ban cruelty (in its many forms) without fear
of judicial contravention. Nonetheless, as noted previously, the Court chose not to rule
on the compelling state interest question and struck down the law as unconstitutionally
overbroad. Ironically, the Court’s avoidance of the issue may constitute a net positive for
animal advocacy.
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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS VERSUS
COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS

The Third Circuit, in vacating Stevens’s conviction and ruling 18 U.S.C. § 48 unconstitutional, stated (mistakenly, in my view) that the Supreme Court had previously
suggested that preventing animal cruelty did not amount to a compelling state interest.2 That (mis)interpretation is important because the government had maintained
that decreasing the acts of cruelty that go into the making of crush videos (whose
provenance and creators are often very difficult to trace) required diminishing the
market for the videos themselves. The most effective way to do that involved illegalizing the products. And, the argument went, since neither the expression nor the acts
depicted contained any redeeming social value, Congress had the authority to ban
them. However, outlawing a type of speech based on its content treads directly on the
realm guarded by the First Amendment. Those protections can be overridden only if
the restriction is necessary to further a compelling state interest. Thus, for Congress
to ban the content of videos depicting illegal animal cruelty, its reasons for doing so
must be both urgent and necessary.
The First Amendment Versus Animal Cruelty—The Lukumi Case

The Supreme Court has carved out several categories of speech to which it does not extend
First Amendment protections. Each of them (obscenity, defamation, fraud, fighting words,
and speech integral to criminal conduct) has a clear connection to a well-understood
compelling state interest. The Stevens Court was properly reluctant to add a new class
of speech to those existing categories. Yet, by declining to directly address the issue, the
Court left the Third Circuit’s analysis uncorrected. The Court had previously considered
the question of whether prevention of animal cruelty rose to the level of compelling state
interest in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, a 1993 case dealing with
animal sacrifice and the First Amendment. It did not, however, definitively rule on the
issue in that case either (Cassuto, 2008).
In Lukumi, the Court faced a set of local ordinances banning animal sacrifice that were
clearly aimed at a newly established Santería church in the city of Hialeah, Florida. The
laws, enacted amid xenophobic rhetoric, outlawed animal sacrifice, a key component of
Santería ritual. The church sued, claiming that the city was unconstitutionally interfering
with its First Amendment right to freedom of religion. The Supreme Court held for the
church, finding, amid some tortured reasoning, that the ordinances did indeed violate
the First Amendment.
Like laws restricting speech, laws aimed at limiting religious practices must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest. The ordinances banning animal sacrifice in
Lukumi purportedly aimed to deter animal cruelty. Consequently, if preventing animal
cruelty constituted a compelling state interest, and the Hialeah laws were necessary to
further that interest (and if they met several other conditions), then they theoretically
could withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, though it discussed the compelling
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state interest question at some length, the Court invalidated the laws on other grounds,
including overbreadth and under-inclusiveness. As a result, the compelling state interest
question remained unresolved.
Is Preventing Animal Cruelty a Compelling State Interest?

The question of whether preventing animal cruelty constitutes a compelling state interest
is not easily answered. The porous nature of existing state and federal statutes suggests that
it might be difficult to classify protection of all animals as a state interest at all, much less a
compelling one. Although companion animals enjoy some legal protections, their interests
are always subordinate to the interests of the people who legally own them. Consequently,
the animals’ legal rights and ability to enforce those rights remain minimal. More dire still
is the situation of non-companion animals. Many states exempt animal agriculture from
the scope of their cruelty laws despite routine and ongoing brutality within the meat, dairy,
and egg industries. Though many if not most Americans believe animals who are farmed
ought to be better treated, only a small minority believes that those animals should not be
killed for food. Most also do not oppose hunting or fishing, and an even smaller percentage
opposes the use of animals for producing dairy and egg products.
On the federal side, the Animal Welfare Act excludes all farmed animals. It also excepts laboratory mice and rats, despite their comprising the overwhelming majority of
vivisected animals. Similarly, the Humane Slaughter Act excludes chickens and turkeys.
This means that more than 98% of the 10 billion animals annually killed for food in the
United States lack even this basic legal protection.
Still, all 50 states have animal cruelty statutes, and the trend in recent years has been
to widen rather than narrow the reach of those statutes. The range of protections and
public attention afforded animals suggest that the nation’s interest in animal protection
varies and that existing laws do not always reflect the depth of public concern. The degree
of interest depends on the particular animals and circumstances. Under the current legal
framework, one can raise and then kill some animals (e.g., pigs, cows, and sheep) for food
but not others (horses, dogs, and cats). Even among animals raised for slaughter, some
must be killed “humanely,” whereas others need not be.
Is Preventing Certain Types of Animal Cruelty a Compelling State Interest?

Clearly, the laws protect some animals more than others. It follows that even without any
normative shift in society’s view of animals, the state could possess a compelling interest
in protecting certain animals from certain types of mistreatment. Other animals facing
human-caused harm do not engender the same level of interest. Therefore, determining
whether a compelling state interest exists would require a fact-specific inquiry focusing
on existing laws, the animals involved, the degree of public concern, and other competing
societal priorities (Cassuto, 2008).
An additional law outlawing a particular type of animal mistreatment while leaving
others exposed to peril would blend readily into the patchwork that is the current animal
protection regime. That law might, for example, protect certain animals from certain types
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of death that are viewed as not needful while allowing those same animals to be killed in
other ways for other reasons.3 Wanton cruelty for purposes of entertainment or sexual
gratification could fall into a state-defined category of non-needful uses. Consequently,
a court might recognize that the state has a compelling interest in barring such behavior
while nevertheless permitting other forms of animal killing and mistreatment. Existing
categories of unprotected speech make clear that the Court’s jurisprudence allows for
such boundary-drawing.
THE STEVENS MAJORITY USES TRADITION
TO TRUMP PRECEDENT
Ferber Is on Point

In 1982 in New York v. Ferber, the Court held child pornography to be unprotected
speech. Its justification—that the market for child pornography was “intrinsically related” to the underlying abuse and therefore “an integral part of the production of such
materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation” (United States v. Stevens, 2010, p.
258)—seems directly pertinent to crush videos as well as to the animal-fighting videos
for which Stevens was prosecuted. However, the Court refused to concede the analogy
between the two laws or the circumstances that created them. Justice Robert’s majority
opinion goes to considerable lengths to distinguish Ferber.
For example, in explaining why depictions of cruelty are protected speech, the majority notes that there is no tradition in the United States of banning such depictions
(as opposed to the behavior itself). It is hard to see the relevance of this reasoning.
There is also no tradition in the United States of barring depictions of children being
eviscerated. Nevertheless, there exists a strong tradition of banning the evisceration
itself. I suspect that the Court would have little problem with a statute barring depictions of illegal eviscerations if it could be shown that the statute was a necessary step
toward ending the practice.
Even Justice Alito’s dissent in Stevens offers an affirmation that cruelty to animals
cannot and should not be compared to human suffering. Despite acknowledging the
many parallels between Ferber and Stevens and arguing that Ferber’s holding should
bind the Court and that “the state has a compelling interest in preventing the torture
depicted in crush videos,” Alito nonetheless avowed that “preventing the abuse of children
is certainly much more important than preventing the torture of animals used in crush
videos.” Since the issue is not whether child exploitation is more or less important than
animal brutalization but rather whether the latter has any redeeming social value, the
comparison seems unhelpful.
The Court further rejected “ad hoc” balancing tests that weigh the relative social
costs and benefits of the affected speech. This too seems off-topic. No one—including
the government—argued that the curtailing speech was a matter to be taken lightly.
Rather, the government maintained that the need to curtail the crush video market was
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so compelling as to make the law necessary. This reasoning resembles the approach in
Ferber, wherein the Court held that the state’s interest in eliminating the exploitation
of children outweighed the state’s interest in protecting speech of limited (or no) social
value. It did not require a tradition of filmed child exploitation to reach its decision. The
need to curtail the exploitation through restricting the video market was enough.
Stevens presented an analogous situation. The state sought to halt the spread of crush
videos and other depictions of wanton animal cruelty by attacking the market for such images. That approach involved regulating speech. Therefore, the question before the Court
could (or should) have been, does preventing animal cruelty rise to the level of compelling
state interest? Rather than address the question directly, the Court struck down the law as
overbroad (it found that the statute potentially illegalized too many types of legal behavior,
including hunting videos and certain types of journalism) and rationalized its decision by
manufacturing fanciful hypotheticals in which the law could be applied unconstitutionally.
This practice, though a useful reasoning tool, is not dispositive. Law professors make their
living dreaming up hypotheticals in which statutes might be applied in ways that violate
the Constitution. The fact that such hypotheticals can be conjured does not typically suffice as justification for voiding a law. The issue is (or should be and traditionally has been)
whether the law applies unconstitutionally to the party challenging that law. The Ferber
Court made this clear (New York v. Ferber, 1982).
Stevens Does Little to Change the Legal Landscape

Even if the Stevens Court had recognized cruelty prevention as a compelling state interest, that still might not have salvaged 18 U.S.C. § 48. The law contained serious flaws,
some of which had little to do with animal cruelty. For example, it exempted depictions
that would otherwise be illegal but for their “serious” value. This “savings clause” supposedly restricted the law’s reach solely to prurient depictions. However, it also put the
purveyor of the expression in the position of having to prove the legality of her speech.
That means the law presumed the speech to be unprotected. It fell to the speaker to
disprove that assumption. That constitutionally problematic burden shift could have
doomed the law all by itself.
In sum, the Stevens holding left the Court and the law with respect to animal cruelty
in much the same limbo in which it had found them. A broad and flawed law was struck
down; the Court’s reluctance to make content-based restrictions on speech was reaffirmed; and the Court’s disinclination to directly address the importance of preventing
animal cruelty remains. Ironically, that unwillingness to tackle the cruelty question may
actually amount to a net positive for animal advocates.
The complex and contradictory relationships Americans have with animals and animal
cruelty, as well as the current makeup of the Court, make it unlikely that the compelling state interest argument would have received a sympathetic hearing. Meanwhile,
the current state of limbo is not causing damage. Under the existing framework, states
and the federal government can still enact animal protection laws. The Court’s case law
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suggests that those protections can even place limits on protected expression as long as
those constraints are incidental rather than integral to the intent of the law.
For example, in the 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held
that if the state acts in a religiously neutral manner, it does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment even when its actions incidentally burden practitioners
of a particular religious faith. In Smith, two drug counselors at an Oregon rehabilitation
facility who were fired for ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes during a Native
American ritual sued when they were denied unemployment compensation. The Court
upheld the law and denied compensation because the state’s intent was to prevent drug
abuse, not to interfere with religious practices. Oregon did not intentionally target religious practices by enacting or enforcing the law. Any burdens placed on religion were
incidental, and the law was rationally connected to a legitimate state interest. Since the
law passed the “rational basis” test, it did not violate the First Amendment. Although
Smith did not purport to overrule prior case law, previous cases had held that if a law
burdened religious beliefs, it had to pass strict scrutiny (i.e., be narrowly tailored to meet
a compelling state interest) to survive (Cassuto, 2008).
Applying the reasoning of Smith to the issue of animal cruelty, we can extrapolate that
if a law designed to prevent animal cruelty were to incidentally burden a fundamental
right (i.e., free speech), it need not pass the strict scrutiny test but rather need only be
rationally connected to a legitimate state interest. That latter requirement is much easier
to meet. Thus, even under the Court’s existing jurisprudence wherein animal cruelty
has not been recognized as a compelling state interest, cruelty statutes that incidentally
burden fundamental rights can still survive.
CONCLUSION

All told, the Stevens ruling could have been a lot worse. Indeed, given the confused and
conflicting laws and ethics regarding nonhuman animals in the United States, it is hard
to see how it could have gone much better. What is more, the next time the issue comes
before the Court, Congress will have already asserted its belief that preventing certain
types of animal cruelty does rise to the level of compelling state interest. Section 2 of
H.R. 5566, the new law banning crush videos, explicitly finds that “the Federal Government and the States have a compelling interest in preventing intentional acts of extreme
animal cruelty.” Although “extreme animal cruelty” may differ from simple animal cruelty
(the law does not say), any difference would be of degree rather than of kind. Consequently, laws banning certain types of animal cruelty—even when such bans constrain
fundamental rights—now have a better chance of surviving judicial review. Thus, since
it galvanized Congress to write a new law explicitly recognizing that protecting animals
amounts to a compelling state interest, the loss of the Stevens case may well have been
the best possible result for animal protection.
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Notes
1. The First Amendment states in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . [or] to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”
2. See Stevens (2008, p. 226), listing reasons animal cruelty is not a compelling state interest
and noting that “the Supreme Court has suggested that the kind of government interest at issue
in § 48 is not compelling.”
3. For example, a dog living in a domestic situation cannot be poisoned, mutilated, or sensorially deprived, yet if that same dog were to find himself or herself the subject of a sanctioned
scientific research project, he or she could suffer any or all of those fates.
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